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VIRTUAL CURRENCY AS CRYPTO
COLLATERAL UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UCC: TRYING TO FIT A SQUARE PEG IN A
ROUND HOLE
Sharon E. Foster*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the current state of academic discussion regarding the problems of creating an enforceable security
interest under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
using virtual currency, such as bitcoin, as collateral.1 While academic discussion is helpful and, indeed, may one day be adopted
by a court and become law, the primary problem in using virtual
currency as collateral is the uncertainty regarding using Article 9
to create an enforceable security interest in virtual currency.
Simply put, Article 9 does not specifically address virtual currency as collateral, and we have no case law at this time to rely
upon.
In addressing this uncertain state of affairs, this Article shall
examine the four primary considerations regarding creating an enforceable security interest: scope, creation, perfection, and tracing. First, does the scope of Article 9 of the UCC apply to virtual
currency? As indicated in Part II, this is not a settled issue. Virtual currency would probably have to qualify as personal property
to be covered under the scope provisions of Article 9. While it
seems likely that virtual currency will qualify as personal

* Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author would like to thank the
University of Arkansas School of Law for its generous summer research grant and Professor
Carol Goforth for her gentle persuasion in convincing me to tackle this research.
1. Additional problems regarding virtual currency, including purchase money security
interests, duties regarding collateral, liability risks, proceeds, disposition of collateral, and
accounting requirements are not discussed in this paper. However, some of these issues are
addressed in Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, Current Issues: UCC Articles 2 and 2A;
Virtual Currency, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 59, 66-67 (2017). For purposes of this paper, I have used the term “virtual currency” rather than “cryptocurrency” or other like terms.
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property, there is some uncertainty that will only be resolved by
case law or a revision of Article 9 to clarify this issue.
Second, the creation of a security interest in virtual currency
is discussed in Part III. Here, as with the scope issue, there are
definitional problems. Creation of a security interest requires evidence of a voluntary lien by the debtor2 “that provides a description of the collateral.”3 If the collateral is not properly described,
there is no security interest.4 Current practice is to use UCC defined collateral description, when possible, to avoid a finding of
an insufficient description.5 However, as with scope, virtual currency does not neatly fit into the UCC defined collateral descriptions.
Third, the issue of perfection of the security interest will be
discussed in Part IV. As with scope and creation, perfection of a
security interest depends on the type of collateral. There are four
mechanisms for perfection: filing a financing statement, control,
possession, and automatic perfection.6 As explained in more detail, it is critical that the secured party select the proper mechanism of perfection in order to ensure perfection is achieved and
priority secured.7 When one does not know the collateral type, as
with the case of virtual currency, there is the possibility of improper perfection creating significant uncertainty.
Finally, Part V addresses the problems of tracing. This issue
arises in situations where there was the creation and perfection of
a security interest, but the debtor subsequently transfers the collateral to a third party.8 The first issue to address is whether the
security interest remains with virtual currency collateral in the
hands of a third-party transferee. And second, even if the security
interest remains, how can the secured party trace specific virtual

2. U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
3. § 9-203(b)(3)(A); U.C.C. § 9-108 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
4. § 9-108.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 74-80.
6. U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-314
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-312(a)-(b) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9-313(a)-(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2019); U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 177-89.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 210-12; U.C.C. § 9-201(a) cmt. 2 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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currency to a third-party transferee? Given the nature of virtual
currency, these four issues underscore the current state of commercial inefficiency of Article 9 for virtual currency as collateral.
II. DOES ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE APPLY?
The first step in determining if a creditor can obtain an enforceable security interest in virtual currency is to establish the
applicability of Article 9 of the UCC. To ascertain the answer to
that question, we must look to the scope of Article 9 under section
9-109:
(a) General scope of article.
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this
article applies to:
(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a
security interest in personal property or fixtures by
contract;
(2) an agricultural lien;
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes;
(4) a consignment;
(5) a security interest arising under Section 2-401, 2505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5), as provided in Section 9110; and
(6) a security interest arising under Section 4-210 or 5118.9

Few academic papers examine this first step in detail. However, the scope issue has not been settled. To illustrate, at its October 2019 meeting, the Uniform Law Commission Joint Study
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging
Technologies stated as one of the issues to consider: “Does the
UCC apply?”10
9. U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
Section 9-109 also lists transactions to which Article 9 does not apply. § 9-109(d). While
not addressed in this article, issues relating to state, federal, and foreign laws which may
preempt Article 9 could receive significant attention in the near future. Brackets originally
existing in the UCC provisions have been omitted to clearly express any changes made by
the author.
10. Joint Study Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technologies, Issues List, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2019), [https://perma.cc/ND3U-NKYF].
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Is Virtual Currency “Personal Property?”

The general consensus in the academic community assumes
that virtual currency would be “personal property” under Article
9.11 If virtual currency is personal property, it would qualify for
Article 9 coverage under section 9-109(a)(1).12 Currently, virtual
currency has been defined as “property” by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) for tax purposes.13 In general, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)14 defines virtual currency using the IRS definition.15
That said, it is not at all clear that courts will deem virtual
currency to be personal property for purposes of Article 9 of the
UCC. This is, in part, due to the intangible nature of virtual currency and courts’ rather conservative view of property as tangible.
For example, in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International,
Inc.,16 the court was confronted with whether a domain name was
truly property or services.17 The court concluded “a domain name
registration is the product of a contract for services between the
registrar and registrant,” rather than a true form of personal property.18 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a domain name
11. See Miller & Harrell, supra note 1, at 66; Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Note, Cryptocurrencies and the Uniform Commercial Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 U. P.R.
BUS. L.J. 129, 134 (2017); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code,
24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 18 (2016).
12. § 9-109(a)(1) (stating that Article 9 applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form,
that creates a security interest in personal property”).
13. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 [hereinafter I.R.S. Notice] (“For federal
tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property. General tax principles applicable to
property transactions apply to transactions using virtual currency.”) (emphasis added); see
also Anthony F. Fata & Brian P. O’Connell, The Blockchain Bandwagon: Cryptocurrency
on the Move, CBA REC., Jan. 2018, at 30.
14. The CFTC is an independent U.S. governmental agency that regulates the U.S.
commodities including derivatives markets. “In 2014, the CFTC declared virtual currencies
to be a ‘commodity’ subject to oversight under its authority under the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA).” CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL
CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N 1 (Jan. 4,
2018), [https://perma.cc/CFP9-TRZ2]. CFTC activities regarding cryptocurrency may include regulating Bitcoin futures exchanges (BitFinex) and enforcing the laws related to derivatives platforms. Id.
15. PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N 4 (Oct. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/752A-DY74] [hereinafter CFTC PRIMER].
16. Network Sols., Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
17. Id. at 85-86.
18. Id. at 86 (quoting Dorel v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)) (internal
quotations omitted).
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is “an intangible property right.”19 This confusion shows judicial
difficulty in conceptualizing intangible property rights which, in
turn, creates difficulties in even getting past the first hurdle—does
Article 9 apply?20 As for the remaining categories of coverage
under the Article 9 scope provision, an agricultural lien; a sale of
accounts; chattel paper; payment intangibles or promissory notes;
a consignment; a security interest arising under sections 2-401, 2505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5), as provided in section 9-110; and a
security interest arising under sections 4-210 or 5-118 are most
likely not applicable.21
B.

Virtual Currency Is Not an “Agricultural Lien”

An “agricultural lien” is defined as “an interest in farm products:”
(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation
for:
(i) goods or services furnished in connection with a
debtor’s farming operation; or
(ii) rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming operation;
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:
(i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished
goods or services to a debtor in connection with a
debtor’s farming operation; or
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with
the debtor’s farming operation; and
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person’s
possession of the personal property.22

To fall under the scope provision here, virtual currency would
have to qualify as a farm product, which is highly unlikely.23

19. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. See Christopher K. Odinet, Bitproperty and Commercial Credit, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 649, 680-93 (2017).
21. See discussion infra Sections Ⅱ.B-I.
22. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
23. § 9-102(a)(34) (defining “farm products”).
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Virtual Currency Is Not an “Account”

For purposes of “sale of accounts,” an “account” is defined
and discussed in Section III.B.1,24 which concludes that virtual
currency would not be considered an account.25
D.

Virtual Currency Is Not “Chattel Paper”

“Chattel paper” is defined as a:
[R]ecord or records that evidence both a monetary obligation
and a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in
specific goods and software used in the goods, a security interest in specific goods and license of software used in the
goods, a lease of specific goods, or a lease of specific goods
and license of software used in the goods. In this paragraph,
“monetary obligation” means a monetary obligation secured
by the goods or owed under a lease of the goods and includes
a monetary obligation with respect to software used in the
goods. The term does not include (i) charters or other contracts involving the use or hire of a vessel or (ii) records that
evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit
or charge card or information contained on or for use with
the card. If a transaction is evidenced by records that include
an instrument or series of instruments, the group of records
taken together constitutes chattel paper.26

First, it is doubtful that virtual currency meets the definition of
“record,” which is defined as “information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.”27 Virtual currency
is transferable but not retrievable in a perceivable form. Second,
a “monetary obligation”28 is the requirement to pay money.29 As
discussed in Section III.B.6, virtual currency does not qualify as
money.30
Finally, virtual currency does not evidence a “security interest” such as an Article 9 security interest. Virtual currency has
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See discussion infra Section Ⅲ.B.1.
See § 9-102(a)(2).
§ 9-102(a)(11) (emphasis added).
§ 9-102(a)(70).
“Monetary obligation” is not defined in the U.C.C. See § 9-102(a).
See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Hendrickson, 526 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
See discussion infra Section Ⅲ.B.6.
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variously been defined as: “a digital unit of exchange that is not
backed by a government-issued legal tender”31; “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but
. . . does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction”32; and “a
digital representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value.”33 None of these
definitions line-up with the definition of a security interest which
means “an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation.”34
As indicated above, it is unclear if virtual currency will be
deemed personal property.35 As for “fixtures,” this is not applicable, as a fixture means “goods that have become so related to
particular real property that an interest in them arises under real
property law.”36 This is hardly an attribute of virtual currency.
Further, the above IRS and CFTC definition of virtual currency
does not indicate a mechanism to “secure payment or other performance of an obligation.”37
E.

Virtual Currency Is Not a “Payment Intangible”

A “payment intangible” is “a general intangible under which
the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.”38 As noted, a monetary obligation39 is the requirement to
pay money,40 and virtual currency does not meet the definition of
money.41

31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND
CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 3
(2013).
32. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001, GUIDANCE
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR
USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), [https://perma.cc/J7HJ-Q6RD] [hereinafter
FIN-2013-G001].
33. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 13.
34. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added).
35. See discussion supra Section II.A.
36. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(41) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
37. § 9-102(a)(59).
38. § 9-102(a)(61) (emphasis added).
39. “Monetary obligation” is not defined in Article 9 of the U.C.C. See § 9-102(a).
40. See Aetna Fin. Co. v. Hendrickson, 526 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
41. See discussion infra Section III.B.6.
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Virtual Currency Is Not a “Promissory Note”

A “promissory note” is defined as “an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence
an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a
bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or
funds.”42 As indicated in Section III.B.4, virtual currency does
not qualify as an “instrument,”43 and, as discussed above, virtual
currency does not evidence a promise to pay a monetary obligation.44
G. Virtual Currency Is Not a “Consignment”
Under Article 9 of the UCC, “consignment” means:
[A] transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
(A) the merchant:
(i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than
the name of the person making delivery;
(ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others;
(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the
goods is $1,000 or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before
delivery; and
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obligation.45

Here, there is a requirement of a transaction in “goods,” which are
defined as “all things . . . which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . .”46 The problem for virtual
currency lies in the “moveable” requirement. Generally, to be

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

§ 9-102(a)(65) (emphasis added).
See discussion infra Section III.B.4.
See discussion supra in Sections II.D-E.
§ 9-102(a)(20) (emphasis added).
U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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moveable the item in question must be tangible.47 Virtual currency is more akin to an intangible.48
H. Virtual Currency Does Not Qualify Under the Scope
Provisions That Reference UCC Articles 2 and 2A
Sections 2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3), and 2A-508(5) referenced
under the scope provision of Article 9 apply to Article 2, which
applies to the sale of goods, or Article 2A, which applies to
leases.49 The scope of Article 2 is limited to goods,50 which does
not apply to virtual currency, as discussed above.
As for Article 2A, its scope is limited to “any transaction . . .
that creates a lease.”51 A “lease” is defined as “a transfer of the
right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration . . . .”52 In addition to the probable inapplicability of a
transfer of a right to possession and use for virtual currency, there
is the additional inapplicability based on the limitation to goods.
I.

Virtual Currency Does Not Qualify Under the Scope
Provisions That Reference UCC Articles 4 and 5

As for sections 4-210 and 5-118 under the scope provision
of Article 9, Article 4 of the UCC addresses bank deposits and
collections,53 and section 4-210 is specifically limited to a “collecting bank,” which is defined as “a bank handling an item for
collection except the payor bank.”54 A “bank” is defined as “an
organization that is engaged in the business of banking. The term
47. See Adam Epstein, Sales and Sports Law, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 67, 70
(2008); Nancy S. Kim, Expanding the Scope of the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts to Include Digital Content, 84 TUL. L. Rev. 1595, 1597 (2010); Frank D. Nguyen,
Regulation of Medical Expert Systems: A Necessary Evil?, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187,
1199 (1994).
48. An intangible is not defined in the UCC but is generally defined as something “that
does not exist as a physical thing but is still valuable to a company.” Intangible, OXFORD
LEARNER’S DICTIONARIES (last visited Mar. 20, 2020), [https://perma.cc/W5AT-2KKH].
49. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 2A-102
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
50. § 2-102.
51. § 2A-102.
52. U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(j) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
53. U.C.C. § 4-101 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
54. U.C.C. § 4-105(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added).
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includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies.”55
The Official Comments are not much help here: “The revised definition of ‘deposit account’ incorporates the definition of
‘bank,’ which is new. The definition derives from the definitions
of ‘bank’ in Sections 4-105(1) and 4A-105(a)(2), which focus on
whether the organization is ‘engaged in the business of banking.’”56
Case law addressing this issue is unanimous in holding that
the “business of banking” for purposes of the UCC is a functional
test, not a question regarding whether the entity is chartered under
state or federal law.57 Accordingly, an entity that accepts deposits, issues notes, provides checking account services, transfers
funds, and loans is in the business of banking.58 The critical issue
here is that virtual currency is, in most cases, not held by a bank
as that term is defined.59
Article 5 applies to “letters of credit,”60 which are defined as:
[A] definite undertaking that satisfies the requirements of
Section 5-104 by an issuer to a beneficiary at the request or
for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial
institution, to itself or for its own account, to honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of an item of
value.61

Section 5-118 is limited to a security interest for “[a]n issuer or
nominated person . . . in a document presented under a letter of

55. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(8) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
56. § 9-102 cmt. 12.
57. See Whitaker v. Wedbush Securities, Inc., No. 1-18-1455, 2019 WL 1319858, *2
(Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 21, 2019); Brooks v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, 57 So. 3d 1153, 1159
(La. Ct. App. 2011); McCray v. Commonwealth, 556 S.E.2d 50, 51 (Va. Ct. App. 2001);
Childers v. State, 813 N.E.2d 432, 435-36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Edward D. Jones & Co. v.
Mishler, 983 P.2d 1086, 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Pinasco v. Del Pilar Ara, 219 A.D.2d
540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Woods v. MONY Legacy Life Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 1070,
1072 (N.Y. 1994); Morris v. Marshall, 305 S.E.2d 581, 586 (W. Va. 1983).
58. See Whitaker, 2019 WL 1319858 at *2; Brooks, 57 So. 3d at 1160; McCray, 556
S.E.2d at 51-52; Childers, 813 N.E.2d at 435-36; Mishler, 983 P.2d at 1093; Pinasco, 219
A.D.2d at 541; Woods, 641 N.E.2d at 1072; Morris, 305 S.E.2d at 586.
59. See Kevin Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 549 (2018).
60. U.C.C. § 5-101 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
61. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(10) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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credit . . . .”62 Issuers and nominated persons are usually banks,63
and section 5-118 requires a “document,” defined as:
[A] draft or other demand, document of title, investment security, certificate, invoice, or other record, statement, or representation of fact, law, right, or opinion (i) which is presented in a written or other medium permitted by the letter
of credit or, unless prohibited by the letter of credit, by the
standard practice referred to in Section 5-108(e) and (ii)
which is capable of being examined for compliance with the
terms and conditions of the letter of credit. A document may
not be oral.64

As the scope of this section is limited to persons, often
banks, specified in a document, and virtual currency does not
specify a person nor a document, this provision is inapplicable.
To recap, the most likely scope provision under Article 9 of
the UCC to apply would be personal property under section 9109(a)(1). The remaining scope provisions are not applicable.
III. CREATION OF A SECURITY INTEREST
Assuming a court will determine that virtual currency is personal property covered by Article 9 of the UCC, step two for a
creditor would be to properly create a security interest. To create
a security interest, there must be a security agreement.65 For the
security agreement to effectively create a security interest, the security agreement must establish attachment.66 Attachment requires: (1) value to be given; (2) the debtor to have rights in the
collateral; and (3) evidence of a voluntary lien by the debtor67
“that provides a description of the collateral . . . .”68 Value given
is similar to consideration; however, value given may be past or
present value.69 In essence, there are no past consideration issues
62. U.C.C. § 5-118(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
63. See § 5-102(a)(9), (11).
64. § 5-102(a)(6).
65. “‘Security agreement’ means an agreement that creates or provides for a security
interest.” U.C.C § 9-102(a)(74) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
66. See U.C.C § 9-203(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
67. § 9-203(b)(1)-(3).
68. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
69. See § 9-203(b)(1) (requiring that “value has been given”); § 9-102(a)(57) (defining
“new value”).
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as may be present under most contract formation requirements.70
While mere naked possession is not enough to establish rights in
the collateral,71 legal title is not required.72 Generally, it does not
appear that the first two requirements for attachment pose a specific problem for virtual currency as collateral under Article 9.
However, the third requirement for attachment, evidence of a voluntary lien, does create a problem as one must describe the collateral for a security interest to attach. How does a creditor
properly describe the virtual currency in the security agreement?73
A.

Describing Collateral in a Security Agreement

The collateral description in the security agreement is sufficient “if it reasonably identifies what is described.”74 What would
be a reasonable identification for virtual currency? A safe harbor
for a reasonable identification is provided in sections 9-108(b),
(d), and (e):
(b) Examples of reasonable identification.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description
of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies
the collateral by:
(1) specific listing [such as “Ethan Allan maple dining
room set”75];
(2) category [for example, “crops”76 or “all machinery”77];
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a
type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial
Code;
(4) quantity [such as “three printing presses”78];
70. 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:13 (4th ed. 2019); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 86 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
71. See, e.g., Jerke Constr., Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. Bank, 2005 SD 19, ¶ 12, 693
N.W.2d 59, 63.
72. See, e.g., In re Whatley, 874 F.2d 997, 1004 (5th Cir. 1989).
73. See § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (requiring a description of the collateral).
74. U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
75. § 9-108(b)(1); Jo M. Pasqualucci, Revised Article 9 in South Dakota with Emphasis
on Newly Included Agricultural Liens, 46 S.D. L. REV. 449, 462 (2001) (citing to S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-108(b) (Supp. 2000)).
76. § 9-108(b)(2); Newsom v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 259, at 8, 427
S.W.3d 688, 694.
77. § 9-108(b)(2); Pasqualucci, supra note 75, at 462.
78. § 9-108(b)(3)-(4); Pasqualucci, supra note 75, at 462.
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(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure
[as in “one-half of all the grain produced”79]; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any
other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
(d) Investment property.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a description
of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity
account is sufficient if it describes:
(1) the collateral by those terms or as investment property; or
(2) the underlying financial asset or commodity contract.
(e) When description by type insufficient.
A description only by type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code is an insufficient description of:
(1) a commercial tort claim; or
(2) in a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity
account.80

In addition, a supergeneric description such as “all the debtor’s
personal property” is not a reasonable identification.81
As provided by section 9-108, descriptions of collateral may
include non-statutory descriptions,82 however, most creditors prefer to use the collateral defined by Article 9 as allowed by section
9-108(b)(3), “a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code”83 in order to avoid the possibility that a court will
find that the collateral description is not sufficient. Attempting to
describe collateral by specific listing, category, quantity, computational or allocational formula or procedure, or by any other
method if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable
has an element of uncertainty. There is little case law on the sufficiency of such collateral descriptions, and secondary sources
provide little guidance. Accordingly, collateral descriptions specified in sections 9-108(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), & (6); 9-108(d); and 979.
80.
81.
82.
83.

§ 9-108(b)(5); Pasqualucci, supra note 75, at 462.
§ 9-108(b), (d), (e).
§ 9-108(c).
§ 9-108(b)(6).
§ 9-108(b)(3).
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108(e) are not addressed in this paper. It is clear that an identification of collateral using the allowed UCC definitions as specified in section 9-108(b)(3) would be best to ensure a reasonable
identification. According to legal commentary, UCC-defined
collateral that may apply to virtual currency includes account, deposit account, general intangible, instruments, investment property, and money.84
While there is no case law on-point at this time, we do have
some administrative agencies that have defined virtual currency.
For example, as indicated in Section II.A, the IRS has defined
virtual currency as property.85 The IRS has further defined virtual
currency as:
[A] digital representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value.
In some environments, it operates like “real” currency—i.e.,
the coin and paper money of the United States or of any other
country that is designated as legal tender, circulates, and is
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in
the country of issuance—but it does not have legal tender
status in any jurisdiction.
Virtual currency that has an equivalent value in real currency, or that acts as a substitute for real currency, is referred
to as “convertible” virtual currency. Bitcoin is one example
of a convertible virtual currency. Bitcoin can be digitally
traded between users and can be purchased for, or exchanged
into, U.S. dollars, Euros, and other real or virtual currencies.86

According to this IRS definition, virtual currency could be described as an account, a general intangible, an instrument, a payment intangible, a promissory note, or a negotiable instrument under UCC Article 9. The critical aspect of these categories is that
virtual currency’s intended use is as a medium of exchange.

84. See Ian A. Holcomb, Bitcoin’s Standing Within the Global Regulatory and Economic Marketplace, 23 CURRENTS: J. INT’L ECON. L. 56, 61-62 (2016); see also Irina
Marinescu, Market Making in Crypto—A Secured Lending Lawyer’s Learnings, 49 U.C.C.
L.J. 159 (2019).
85. I.R.S. Notice, supra note 13.
86. Id.
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The CFTC has found virtual currency to be a commodity in
virtual currency swap situations, as such transactions fall within
the definition of “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
in.”87 The CFTC will regulate in the spot market for a virtual
currency and in derivative markets involving a virtual currency.88
In general, the CFTC defines virtual currency using the IRS
definition.89 Further, the CFTC has provided a list of potential
uses for virtual currency:
Store of Value
– Like precious metals, many virtual currencies are a “nonyielding” asset (meaning they do not pay dividends or interest), but they may be more fungible, divisible, and
portable
– Limited or finite supply of virtual currencies may contrast
with ‘real’ (fiat) currencies
Trading
– Trading in virtual currencies may result in capital gains or
losses
– Note that trading in virtual currencies may involve significant speculation and volatility risk . . .
Payments and Transactions
– Some merchants and online stores are accepting virtual
currencies in exchange for
physical and digital goods (i.e., payments)
– Some public Blockchain systems rely on the payment of
fees in virtual currency form in order to power the network
and underlying transactions
Transfer / Move Money
– Domestic and international money transfer (e.g., remittances) in order to increase
87. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010); Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30.
88. CFTC PRIMER, supra note 15, at 11; Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30. “The
spot market is where financial instruments, such as commodities, currencies and securities,
are traded for immediate delivery.” Tim Smith, Spot Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 19, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/6TZK-RNAE]. Swaps “involve the sale or purchase of [an asset or liability] on one date and the offsetting purchase or sale . . . on a future date, with both dates agreed
when the transaction is initiated.” See MARC LEVINSON, GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKETS
16 (4th ed. 2005); James Chen, Swap, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S6R3WM77]. “A derivative is a financial security with a value that is reliant upon or derived
from, an underlying asset or group of assets . . . .” James Chen, Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/BW3N-YEPE].
89. CFTC PRIMER, supra note 15, at 4.
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efficiencies and potentially reduce related fees90

By this definition, virtual currency used as a medium of exchange may be described as an account, a general intangible, an
instrument, a payment intangible, a promissory note, or a negotiable instrument under UCC Article 9. However, Article 9 also
provides for more specific collateral categories for commodities
such as a commodity account or commodity contract.91 The problem is it depends upon the intended use.
In 2017, an influx of initial coin offerings (ICOs) brought
virtual currency to the attention of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).92 The SEC found that an ICO is a fundraising event similar to initial public offerings (IPOs).93 Many ICOs
meet the definition of a security pursuant to the “investment contract” test.94 Under the investment contract test, “an instrument is
a security if it constitutes an investment of money in a common
enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”95 In its
July 25, 2017 report on Decentralized Autonomous Organization,
the SEC concluded that the ICOs at issue were securities under
the investment contract test.96 Further, virtual currency exchanges may be considered Securities Exchanges requiring registration compliance under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.97
The SEC uses the Financial Action Task Force98 definition
of virtual currency:
90. Id. at 7.
91. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(14)-(15) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
92. ASS’N. OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS , ICOS: REAL DEAL OR TOKEN
GESTURE?: EXPLORING INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS 5 (2018), [https://perma.cc/ZK5V-Q8C4].
93. Id.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). For the investment contract test announced by
the Supreme Court, see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). See also Fata &
O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30.
95. Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30; Howey, 328 U.S. at 298, 301.
96. SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO 1 (2017), [https://perma.cc/NJ7T-CV5T].
97. Fata & O’Connell, supra note 13, at 30.
98. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, The Financial Action Task Force, FINCEN,
[https://perma.cc/4TZY-B6Q3] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (“The Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental policymaking body whose purpose is to establish
international standards, and to develop and promote policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It was formed in
1989 to set out measures to be taken in the fight against money laundering.”).
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[A] digital representation of value that can be digitally traded
and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit
of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid
and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction and fulfils the above
functions only by agreement within the community of users
of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is distinguished
from fiat currency (a.k.a. “real currency,” “real money,” or
“national currency”), which is the coin and paper money of
a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and
is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange
in the issuing country. It is distinct from e-money, which is
a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically
transfer value denominated in fiat currency.99

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)100 defines
virtual currency as:
FinCEN’s regulations define currency (also referred to as
“real” currency) as “the coin and paper money of the United
States or of any other country that (i) is designated as legal
tender and that (ii) circulates and (iii) is customarily used and
accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance.” In contrast to real currency, “virtual” currency is a
medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some
environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual currency does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. This guidance addresses “convertible” virtual currency. This type of virtual currency
either has an equivalent value in real currency, or acts as a
substitute for real currency.101

The definitions provided by the SEC, using the Financial Action
Task Force definition, and FinCEN indicate that virtual currency
used as a medium of exchange may be described as an account, a
general intangible, an instrument, a payment intangible, a promissory note, or a negotiable instrument. However, virtual
99. FATF REPORT, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL
AML/CFT RISKS, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 4 (June 2014), [https://perma.cc/PY7NLLMZ].
100. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, What We Do, FINCEN, [https://perma.cc/A543F3X9] (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (“FinCEN is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury.”).
101. FIN-2013-G001, supra note 32.
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currency may also be used as an investment.102 Article 9 also provides for more specific collateral categories for securities investments that may be applicable such as investment property, financial asset, or securities account.103 The problem is, again, it
depends upon the intended use.
B.

UCC Collateral Categories

Suggested defined UCC collateral categories for virtual currency include account, deposit account, general intangible, instrument, investment property, money, negotiable instrument, payment intangible, and promissory note.104
i.

Account

“Account”, except as used in “account for”, means a right to
payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by
performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold,
leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of . . . . The
term does not include (i) rights to payment evidenced by
chattel paper or an instrument . . ., (iii) deposit accounts, (iv)
investment property, (v) letter-of-credit rights or letters of
credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced
or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or
charge card or information contained on or for use with the
card.105

The most common collateral that falls under the category of
account is an account receivable.106 Assuming virtual currency is
not a right to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument, a deposit account, or investment property (discussed below), is it an account? While the blockchain upon which virtual
102. Thomas Lee Hazen, Virtual or Crypto Currencies and the Securities Laws, 38
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2018.
103. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); see also
U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9), (15) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
104. Holcomb, supra note 84; Marinescu, supra note 84. I have excluded from this
list defined collateral that does not appear to apply, including chattel paper, commercial tort
claim, electronic chattel paper, farm products, fixtures, goods, equipment, health-care-insurance receivable, tangible chattel paper, certificated security, check, lease, lease agreement,
lease contract, and leasehold interest.
105. § 9-102(a)(2).
106. See generally § 9-102(a)(2); Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under
Article 9: Structural Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (2007).
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currency is based has been described as a “ledger,” it does not
appear to constitute a right to payment like an account receivable.
Such “right to payment” is for “property that has been or is to be
sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed.”107 While
one could argue that virtual currency, when sold, constitutes a
right to payment, like other investments, investment property is
specifically excluded from the UCC definition of account.108 Further, converting virtual currency into fiat currency “is not really a
monetary obligation for property sold.”109 It is more akin to the
sale of an investment where the price will be determined by the
market, not a fixed amount as with an account.110
ii.

Deposit Account

A “‘deposit account’ means a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank. The term does
not include investment property or accounts evidenced by an instrument.”111 The critical part of the definition of a deposit account is that it exists only through an intermediary—a bank.112
The term “bank” is defined in Section II.I.113 It is believed that
virtual currency would not qualify as a deposit account, because
neither blockchain nor virtual currency exchanges provide the
functions described as the business of banking.114
iii. General Intangible
Regarding “general intangibles,” they are defined as: “any
personal property, including things in action, other than accounts,
chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit
rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
(29).

See Marinescu, supra note 84.
Id.
Id.; § 9-102(a)(2).
See Marinescu, supra note 84.
§ 9-102(a)(29).
Schroeder, supra note 11, at 22-23.
See supra Section II.I; § 9-102(a)(8).
See Marinescu, supra note 84; Schroeder, supra note 11, at 21-23; § 9-102(a)(8),
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before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and
software.”115
A general intangible is a catchall category defined as the personal property that does not fall within any other Article 9 category.116 It has been held to include such personal property intangibles such as license rights,117 intellectual property,118
expectation of recovery in a personal injury claim (excluding
commercial tort claims),119 software,120 and likely a company’s
customer database.121
Most commentators seem to agree that the general intangible
category is the most likely to apply to virtual currency.122 However, there is still the problem of uncertainty as it is not clear that
virtual currency will be deemed personal property as required for
a general intangible.123
iv.

Instrument

An “instrument” means:
[A] negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences
a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself
a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary
course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include
(i) investment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings
that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a
credit or charge card or information contained on or for use
with the card.124

Section 3-104 defines a “negotiable instrument” as:
115. § 9-102(a)(42).
116. § 9-102 cmt. 5d.
117. In re Media Properties, Inc., 311 B.R. 244, 247, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2004).
118. Rice v. Miller, 864 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
119. In re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886, 903 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
120. Odinet, supra note 20, at 681.
121. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of
Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 458 (2018).
122. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 30; Kevin V. Tu, Crypto-Collateral, 21 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 205, 223 (2018); Ronald J. Mann, Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in
Crypto-Currency, SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 159, 163 (2018); Marinescu, supra note 84;
Odinet, supra note 20, at 681.
123. See supra Section II.A.
124. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added).
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(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), “negotiable
instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay
a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other
charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction
by the person promising or ordering payment to do any
act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to
give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment,
(ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess
judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii)
a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.125

First, instruments reflect monetary obligations which, as stated in
Section II.D, would exclude virtual currency.126 Second, the requirement that a negotiable instrument reflect a “fixed amount of
money” would exclude virtual currency because its value fluctuates as a result of its volatility.127 Third, the definition of instrument seems to require a “writing,” which is defined as “printing,
typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form.
125. U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added). The exceptions referenced, subsections (c) and (d) are not applicable. Subsection
(c) provides that “[a]n order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of ‘check’ in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.” § 3-104(c). Subsection (f) defines a check as “a draft, other
than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or . . . a cashier’s check
or teller’s check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by
another term, such as ‘money order.’” § 3-104(f). Virtual currency is not drawn on a bank,
cashier’s check or teller’s check.
Subsection (d) states that:
A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued
or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement,
however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is
not an instrument governed by this Article.
§ 3-104(d). Virtual currency does not contain such “conspicuous statements.”
126. See supra Section II.D.
127. Tu, supra note 122, at 215; Nicolas Wenker, Note, Online Currency, Real-World
Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 145, 193
(2014). For an example of virtual currency’s volatility, see Billy Bambrough, Bitcoin Moves
Sharply Lower Again as Other Major Cryptocurrencies Go into Free Fall [Updated],
FORBES (Dec. 16, 2019), [https://perma.cc/P79W-QH3A].
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‘Written’ has a corresponding meaning.”128 As indicated above,
virtual currency is not tangible.
Further, Comment 5(c) to section 9-102 states: “[t]he definition of ‘instrument’ includes a negotiable instrument. . . . [I]t also
includes any other right to payment of a monetary obligation that
is evidenced by a writing of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery . . . .129 This, along with the definitional language for instrument “or any other writing”130 confirms
the writing requirement.
Finally, “‘[d]elivery’ . . . with respect to an instrument, a tangible document of title, or chattel paper, means voluntary transfer
of possession.”131 “Possession” is not defined in the UCC but has
been defined by case law as requiring physical possession,132
which is not possible for intangibles. For all of the above stated
reasons, commentators have not advocated for instruments as the
proper category for virtual currency.133
v.

Investment Property

“‘Investment property’ means a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account,
commodity contract, or commodity account.”134 For the definition of a security, certificated security, uncertificated security, security entitlement, and securities account, we must consult Article
8 of the UCC.135 “‘Certificated security’ means a security that is
represented by a certificate.”136 Virtual currency does not have a
tangible form like a certificate, so this definition does not apply.
“‘Uncertificated security’ means a security that is not represented

128. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(43) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
129. § 9-102 cmt. 5(c) (emphasis added).
130. § 9-102(a)(47).
131. § 1-201(b)(15).
132. See Schroeder, supra note 11, at 19; NBD-Sandusky Bank v. Ritter, 446 N.W.2d
340, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). Possession may also include constructive possession. See,
e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Gray, 2013-Ohio-3340, ¶ 25, 2013 WL 3963471, at *5; Farm
Credit of Nw. Fla. v. Easom Peanut Co., 718 S.E.2d 590, 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Georg v.
Metro Fixtures Contractors, Inc., 178 P.3d 1209, 1214 (Colo. 2008).
133. Marinescu, supra note 84; Tu, supra note 122, at 222-24.
134. § 9-102(a)(49).
135. § 9-102(b).
136. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(4) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).

2020

CRYPTO COLLATERAL

285

by a certificate.”137 Generally, this deals with securities that are
evidenced by other means than a certificate, such as a book entry.138 Virtual currency may qualify if it meets the definition of
security:
[A]n obligation of an issuer or a share, participation, or other
interest in an issuer or in property or an enterprise of an issuer:
(i) which is represented by a security certificate in bearer or
registered form, or the transfer of which may be registered
upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of
the issuer;
(ii) which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible
into a class or series of shares, participations, interests, or
obligations; and
(iii) which:
(A) is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities
exchanges or securities markets; or
(B) is a medium for investment and by its terms expressly provides that it is a security governed by this
Article.139

The general consensus is that virtual currency would not meet this
definition, as virtual currency reflects neither an obligation of any
particular entity nor an interest in any cognizable entity or property.140
Some commentators opine that virtual currency may, in
some cases, be a security under federal law definitions:
Although [virtual currency] itself is not a stock or bond, certain [virtual currency] transactions could be characterized as
a scheme devised by those who seek to use the money of
others on the promise of profits. As such, some [virtual currency] uses may fall within the broadly inclusive definition
of a security, likely as an “investment contract” under the
Howey test.141

137. § 8-102(a)(18).
138. See, e.g., § 8-102 cmt. 18; Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013,
1014 (1979).
139. § 8-102(a)(15).
140. Mann, supra note 122, at 162-63; Marinescu, supra note 84.
141. Tu, supra note 122, at 222.
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But as Article 9 specifically incorporates the definitions in Article
8 for investment property,142 reference to federal law is inapplicable.143 Even those commentators who opine that virtual currency
may qualify as a security under federal law seem skeptical that it
would qualify as investment property under Article 9 of the UCC:
However, it appears unlikely that [virtual currency] would
constitute a security in all cases. . . . The implication for the
categorization of [virtual currency] under Article 9 is relatively clear. Investment property as a collateral type does
not appear to fully encompass [virtual currency]. Investment
property is limited, by definition, to securities and the like.
Notwithstanding the broad concept of “securities” under federal securities law, only some applications of [virtual currency], namely, ICOs, will constitute a security. As a result,
the Article 9 collateral category of “investment property”
may not be applicable to [virtual currency] held by a potential borrower. 144

While most commentators seem to be in agreement that virtual currency is not a security, at least two commentators have
argued that virtual currency may still be investment property as it
meets the definition of “security entitlement” or “security account,” as virtual currency is a “financial asset.”145 The pertinent
definitions here are as follows:
“Security entitlement” means the rights and property interest
of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset
specified in Part 5.146
“Securities account” means an account to which a financial
asset is or may be credited in accordance with an agreement
under which the person maintaining the account undertakes
to treat the person for whom the account is maintained as
entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
added).

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) cmt. 6, (b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
See Tu, supra note 122, at 221, 223.
Tu, supra note 122, at 222-23.
Marinescu, supra note 84; Holcomb, supra note 84, at 62.
U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
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(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e),
a person acquires a security entitlement if a securities intermediary:
(1) indicates by book entry that a financial asset has
been credited to the person’s securities account;
(2) receives a financial asset from the person or acquires a financial asset for the person and, in either
case, accepts it for credit to the person’s securities account; or
(3) becomes obligated under other law, regulation, or
rule to credit a financial asset to the person’s securities
account.
(c) If a condition of subsection (b) has been met, a person
has a security entitlement even though the securities intermediary does not itself hold the financial asset.
(d) If a securities intermediary holds a financial asset for another person, and the financial asset is registered in the name
of, payable to the order of, or specially indorsed to the other
person, and has not been indorsed to the securities intermediary or in blank, the other person is treated as holding the
financial asset directly rather than as having a security entitlement with respect to the financial asset.
(e) Issuance of a security is not establishment of a security
entitlement.147

“Financial asset,” except as otherwise provided in Section 8-103,
means:
(i) a security;
(ii) an obligation of a person or a share, participation, or
other interest in a person or in property or an enterprise of a
person, which is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on financial
markets, or which is recognized in any area in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; or
(iii) any property that is held by a securities intermediary for
another person in a securities account if the securities intermediary has expressly agreed with the other person that the
property is to be treated as a financial asset under this Article.

As context requires, the term means either the interest itself
or the means by which a person’s claim to it is evidenced,

147. U.C.C. § 8-501 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
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including a certificated or uncertificated security, a security certificate, or a security entitlement.148
As indicated above, virtual currency is probably not a security, so prong (i) does not apply. It is contended that virtual currency meets prong (ii) for the definition of financial asset, as virtual currency “fall[s] within the definition of a ‘financial asset’
because [it is] an[] ‘interest . . . in property . . . which is, or is of a
type, dealt in or traded on financial markets, or which is recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment.’”149 One problem with this argument is that it does
not consider the Official Comments to the definition of financial
asset which suggest that financial assets must be held in a security
account150 to meet this definition.151 Prong (iii) has the same requirement.152 While this requirement may be met in some circumstances, it requires an intermediary to hold the virtual currency,
which may not be the most efficient use of virtual currency.
Assuming virtual currency does meet the definition of investment property as a financial asset, it would functionally limit
virtual currency to investments rather than a means of payment.
Generally, collateral is categorized at the time of creation by the
security agreement.153 Accordingly, if the debtor is holding the
virtual currency as an investment at the time she enters into the

148. § 8-102(a)(9).
149. Holcomb, supra note 84, at 62 (quoting § 8-102(a)(9)); see also Marinescu, supra
note 84.
150. The official comment reads:
The fact that something does or could fall within the definition of financial asset
does not, without more, trigger Article 8 coverage. The indirect holding system
rules of Revised Article 8 apply only if the financial asset is in fact held in a securities account, so that the interest of the person who holds the financial asset
through the securities account is a security entitlement. Thus, questions of the
scope of the indirect holding system rules cannot be framed as “Is such-and-such
a ‘financial asset’ under Article 8?” Rather, one must analyze whether the relationship between an institution and a person on whose behalf the institution holds
an asset falls within the scope of the term securities account as defined in Section
8-501. That question turns in large measure on whether it makes sense to apply
the Part 5 rules to the relationship.
§ 8-102 cmt. 9.
151. For an argument that bitcoin wallets are “securities accounts,” see Holcomb, supra note 84, at 62.
152. See Marinescu, supra note 84.
153. See, e.g., In re Palmer, 365 B.R. 816, 821 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting In re
Troupe, 340 B.R. 86, 91 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2006)).
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security agreement but subsequently uses it as a payment mechanism, this should not create a problem for the initial collateral description.154 But, if virtual currency is meant to be a payment
mechanism and is held for that purpose, it will not meet the definition of financial asset.155
Finally, “commodity account” and “commodity contract”
are probably not applicable definitions for virtual currency. Commodity account and commodity contract are defined in Article 9:
“Commodity account” means an account maintained by a
commodity intermediary in which a commodity contract is
carried for a commodity customer.156
“Commodity contract” means a commodity futures contract,
an option on a commodity futures contract, a commodity option, or another contract if the contract or option is:
(A) traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that
has been designated as a contract market for such a contract
pursuant to federal commodities laws; or
(B) traded on a foreign commodity board of trade, exchange,
or market, and is carried on the books of a commodity intermediary for a commodity customer.157

There are no commentators suggesting that virtual currency
would fall within the definitions of commodity account or commodity contract. This is probably due to the fact that virtual currency would not be considered a commodity.158 The UCC does
not define “commodity,” but the term is generally defined as “a
basic good used in commerce that is interchangeable with other
goods of the same type. Commodities are most often used as inputs in the production of other goods or services. The quality of

154. See id. It does, however, create tracing and enforcement problems.
155. See § 8-102(a)(9).
156. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(14) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
157. § 9-102(a)(15).
158. However, the CFTC has found virtual currency to be a commodity in virtual currency swaps situations as such transactions fall within the definition of “all services, rights,
and interests . . . in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”
7 U.S.C. § 1a (2010). See also CFTC PRIMER, supra note 15, at 11; Fata & O’Connell, supra
note 13, at 30.
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a given commodity may differ slightly, but it is essentially uniform across producers.”159
“Goods” are defined under the UCC as:
[A]ll things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.
“Goods” also includes the unborn young of animals and
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty
as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty
(Section 2-107).160

These definitions would seem to suggest that commodities are
goods. Goods are moveable, suggesting a tangible rather than an
intangible, such as virtual currency. Accordingly, virtual currency would probably not qualify as a commodity account or
commodity contract.
vi.

Money

While virtual currency may function as a payment mechanism similar to money, it generally does not meet the definition
of “money,” which is: “a medium of exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government. The term
includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more
countries.”161
Virtual currency, such as bitcoin, is not fiat currency; that is
to say it is not “a medium of exchange currently authorized or
adopted by a domestic or foreign government.”162 It has been
noted that one Indian tribe and one foreign country have adopted
virtual currency as money.163 This would seem to meet the definitional requirement.164 However, specific types of virtual currency, such as bitcoin, have not been adopted by any government,
159. James
Chen,
Commodity,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb.
14,
2020),
[https://perma.cc/5TMS-FP45] (emphasis added).
160. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
161. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
162. § 1-201(b)(24).
163. Miller & Harrell, supra note 1; Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21; Mann, supra note
122, at 161-62.
164. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 19.
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so it would not meet the definition of money.165 It has also been
argued that the term money, as used in the UCC requires physical,
or “hand-to-hand,” currency as evidenced by the fact that money
does not include deposit accounts or other forms of storing mediums of exchange.166 This seems to relegate money to the tangible
category rather than an intangible where virtual currency resides.167 Most commentators believe virtual currency would not
meet the definition of money.168
vii. Payment Intangible
A payment intangible is defined as “a general intangible under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary
obligation.”169 Again, as discussed in Section II.E, the requirement of monetary obligation would eliminate virtual currency
from this category.170
viii. Promissory Note
As indicated in Section II.F, virtual currency does not qualify as a promissory note because it is neither an instrument nor
does it evidence a promise to pay a monetary obligation.171
Virtual currency would, most likely, fall under the category
of a general intangible, which seems to be the consensus of most
commentators.172 That said, there is still uncertainty as a court
has not ruled on this issue. Additionally, even if virtual currency
is deemed a general intangible, there are perfection and tracing
problems as discussed in Parts IV and V below.

165. Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21; Mann, supra note 122, at 161-62.
166. Schroeder, supra note 11, at 22-23.
167. Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21.
168. Miller & Harrell, supra note 1; Schroeder, supra note 11, at 10; Bob Lawless, Is
the UCC Article 9 the Achilles Heel of Bitcoin?, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 10, 2014),
[https://perma.cc/QK4Y-WZKS]; Marinescu, supra note 84; Tu, supra note 122, at 220-21;
Mann, supra note 122, at 161-62; Holcomb, supra note 84, at 61.
169. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis
added).
170. See discussion supra Section II.E.
171. See discussion supra Section II.F.
172. See sources cited supra note 122.
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IV. PERFECTION
Once a security interest has been created, meaning atttached,
it must be perfected in order for a creditor/secured party to have
priority vis-à-vis other creditors or to be deemed a secured creditor if the debtor petitions for bankruptcy.173 Perfection is intended
to provide public notice of a creditor’s security interest in the
debtor’s collateral so subsequent creditors can determine if there
is a creditor with priority over the collateral and if there is sufficient collateral to protect further extensions of credit.174 The perfection mechanism to provide public notice is largely premised
on commercial practices and feasibility based upon the type of
collateral.175 To properly perfect, it is critical to have a clear understanding of collateral type, as some collateral types require a
specific mechanism for proper perfection.
There are four mechanisms for perfection: filing a financing
statement,176 control,177 possession of the collateral,178 and automatic perfection.179 Proper perfection depends on the category of
collateral using the same collateral categories discussed above for
description of the collateral under creation of the security interest.
For example, if the virtual currency is considered an account, perfection must be by filing a financing statement.180 Deposit accounts must be perfected by control.181 General intangibles must
be perfected by filing a financing statement.182 A security interest
in instruments or investment property may be perfected by filing
a financing statement,183 however, priority over conflicting investment property security interests, where one is by filing and
173. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1143, 1162 (1979).
174. See Christopher G. Bradley, Disrupting Secured Transactions, 56 HOUS. L. REV.
965, 976-78 (2019).
175. See Kristin N. Johnson et al., (Im)Perfect Regulation: Virtual Currency and Other
Digital Assets as Collateral, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 121 (2018).
176. U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
177. U.C.C. § 9-312(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 9314(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
178. U.C.C. § 9-313 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
179. U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
180. § 9-310(a).
181. § 9-312(b)(1).
182. § 9-310(a).
183. § 9-312(a).
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the other is by control—control has priority.184 Money must be
perfected by possession.185
A.

Filing a Financing Statement

While the collateral description in a financing statement is
more liberal than the collateral description in a security agreement186 by allowing for supergeneric descriptions such as “all personal property,” it is still critical to properly perfect in order to
have a security interest with priority and one that survives bankruptcy. As a practical matter, perfection by filing a financing
statement creates a problem of enforcement for the creditor because the pseudo-anonymous nature of virtual currency makes it
difficult to trace. 187 Additionally, this method of perfection creates a problem for transferees of virtual currency collateral because exceptions for buyers in the ordinary course of business,188
which allow a transferee to take free and clear of security interests, only apply to goods, which as indicated above, would not
include virtual currency. In essence, the transferee of virtual currency may end-up accepting it subject to a security interest. Accordingly, while perfection by filing may work for collateral that
can be perfected by filing, virtual currency has the additional
problems of security interest encumbrances and tracing issues as
discussed more in Part V below.
B.

Perfection by Control

Perfection by control is required for deposit accounts:
(a) Requirements for control. A secured party has control of
a deposit account if:

184. § 9-312 cmts. 2, 4; U.C.C. § 9-328(1), (3), (5), cmts. 2, 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2019).
185. § 9-312(b)(3).
186. In re ProvideRx of Grapevine, LLC, 507 B.R. 132, 163 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014).
187. Josias N. Dewey & Michael D. Emerson, Beyond Bitcoin: How Distributed
Ledger Technology Has Evolved to Overcome Impediments Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 47 U.C.C. L.J. 1 (2017); see Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 130, 140.
188. U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); U.C.C. § 1201(b)(9) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 140;
Schroeder, supra note 11, at 27; Lawless, supra note 168.
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(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit
account is maintained;
(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in
an authenticated record that the bank will comply with
instructions originated by the secured party directing
disposition of the funds in the deposit account without
further consent by the debtor; or
(3) the secured party becomes the bank’s customer
with respect to the deposit account.
(b) Debtor’s right to direct disposition. A secured party that
has satisfied subsection (a) has control, even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account.189

Section 9-104(a)(1) provides for control when the creditor/secured party is a bank.190 As we have seen in Section II.I, to
be a bank, the creditor/secured party must be in the business of
banking.191 Section 9-104(a)(2) requires an authenticated agreement by the bank giving the creditor/secured party access to the
virtual currency.192 Again, we have the problem with the term
bank as with subsection 1. Section 9-104(a)(3) basically allows
for a joint account mechanism over the deposit account or sole
control over the account.193 As with subsection 1, subsections 2
and 3 are difficult to apply to virtual currency as we may not have
an intermediary that qualifies as a bank.194
Perfection by control for investment property requires:
(a) Control under Section 8-106.
A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated
security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 8106.
(b) Control of commodity contract.

A secured party has control of a commodity contract if:
(1) the secured party is the commodity intermediary with
which the commodity contract is carried; or

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

U.C.C. § 9-104 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019) (emphasis added).
§ 9-104(a)(1), cmt. 3.
See supra Section II.I.
§ 9-104(a)(2).
§ 9-104(a)(3).
Miller, supra note 1; Marinescu, supra note 84; Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 141.
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(2) the commodity customer, secured party, and commodity
intermediary have agreed that the commodity intermediary
will apply any value distributed on account of the commodity contract as directed by the secured party without further
consent by the commodity customer.195

Basically, Article 9 of the UCC looks to Article 8 of the UCC
to define control for investment property, such as stock.196 “Control” under Article 8 requires:
(a) A purchaser has “control” of a certificated security in
bearer form if the certificated security is delivered to the purchaser.
(b) A purchaser has “control” of a certificated security in registered form if the certificated security is delivered to the purchaser, and:
(1) the certificate is indorsed to the purchaser or in
blank by an effective indorsement; or
(2) the certificate is registered in the name of the purchaser, upon original issue or registration of transfer by
the issuer.
(c) A purchaser has “control” of an uncertificated security if:
(1) the uncertificated security is delivered to the purchaser; or
(2) the issuer has agreed that it will comply with instructions originated by the purchaser without further
consent by the registered owner.197

Virtual currency would not qualify as a certificated security
because there is no tangible certificate. As for uncertificated securities, there is a requirement for one to be a registered owner,
which is not possible for virtual currency.198 Further, there is a
requirement of “delivery” of uncertificated securities, which is
defined under Article 8 as occurring when “the issuer registers the
purchaser as the registered owner, upon original issue or registration of transfer” or when “another person, other than a securities
intermediary, either becomes the registered owner of the uncertificated security on behalf of the purchaser or, having previously
195.
196.
197.
198.

U.C.C. § 9-106(a)-(b)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
§ 9-106(a).
U.C.C. § 8-106 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
U.C.C. § 8-301(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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become the registered owner, acknowledges that it holds for the
purchaser.”199
So, again, there is a requirement of a registered owner, which
is a problem for virtual currency. For commodity contracts, a
commodity intermediary is required.200 As indicated in Section
III.B.5, the use of an intermediary is not efficient for virtual currency.201
C.

Perfection by Possession

As stated in Section III.B.4, the term possession is not defined in the UCC but has been held to mean physical custody or
constructive custody.202 As it is not possible to perfect an intangible by possession,203 this is not a viable method of perfection for
virtual currency.204
D.

Automatic Perfection

Automatic perfection does not apply to any of the relevant
Article 9 categories discussed for virtual currency.205 As indicated in Part III, virtual currency would most likely be considered
a general intangible requiring perfection by filing.206 While this
may resolve the issue of proper perfection, assuming a court
agrees that virtual currency is a general intangible, given the transient nature of virtual currency, perfection by filing exacerbates
the tracing problem.
V. TRACING
Tracing is a necessary process under Article 9 of the UCC.
Basically, because collateral is often left in the hands of the
debtor,207 there is a problem regarding what happens when the
199. § 8-301(b).
200. § 9-106(b).
201. See supra Section III.B.5.
202. See sources cited supra note 132; see also supra Section III.B.4.
203. Mann, supra note 122, at 163.
204. Id. at 163-64; Miller, supra note 1; Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 141.
205. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
206. See supra Section III.B.3.
207. Collateral left in the hands of the debtor occurs with perfection by filing. It also
is the case with perfection by control, but the secured party has a greater opportunity to stop
the transfer of collateral and to trace. There is not a tracing problem with perfection by
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debtor disposes of the collateral to a third party. The general rule
is that the security interest stays with the collateral in the hands of
a third party.208 However, the secured party must be able to trace
the collateral to ensure that the collateral in question is the collateral to which the security interest has attached.209
There are exceptions to the rule that the security interest
stays with the collateral in the hands of a third party, such as the
buyer in the ordinary course of business rule.210 However, a buyer
in the ordinary course of business is defined as “a person that buys
goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the
rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course
from a person . . . in the business of selling goods of that kind.”211
As discussed in Section II.G, virtual currency does not qualify as
a good, so this exception is most likely not applicable.212
Another exception to the rule that the security interest stays
with the collateral in the hands of the third party is the good faith
purchaser for value exception, which states:
Buyers that receive delivery.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer,
other than a secured party, of tangible chattel paper, documents, goods, instruments, or a certificated security takes
free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the buyer
gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without
knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.213

possession. See U.C.C. §§ 9-310, 9-313, 9-314, 9-328 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2019).
208. Generally, a security agreement is effective against third parties. U.C.C. § 9201(a), cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). Typically, the security interest
in the proceeds in the collateral continues unless the secured party authorized the disposition
of the collateral free of that security interest. U.C.C. § 9-315(a), cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); see also Evan Hewitt, Bringing Continuity to Cryptocurrency:
Commercial Law as a Guide to the Asset Categorization of Bitcoin, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
619, 630 (2016).
209. See § 9-315(a)-(b).
210. “[A] buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its
existence.” U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
211. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
212. See discussion supra Section II.G; see also Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 140;
Hewitt, supra note 208, at 631.
213. U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
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The exception specified in subsection (e) relates to purchase
money security interests which is not applicable to the tracing issue and, thus, not addressed in this analysis. As for the remainder
of the good faith purchaser for value exception, it is limited to
collateral that qualifies as “tangible chattel paper, tangible documents, goods, instruments, or a certificated security.”214 As indicated in Parts II and III, virtual currency would most likely not
qualify as tangible chattel paper, documents, goods, instruments,
or a certificated security.215 Additionally, there is the problem of
the requirement that the buyer “receives delivery.” As stated in
Section III.B.4, delivery requires possession which is not possible
for intangibles like virtual currency.216
Finally, if the collateral is considered money a third-party
transferee of that money will take the collateral free of any security interest.217 As explained in Section III.B.6, virtual currency
does not meet the definition of money.218
As discussed above, if it is possible to create and perfect a
security interest in virtual currency, the most likely possibility
would be as a general intangible perfected by filing. This creates
a tracing problem, as once the virtual currency is transferred to a
third party, it is impossible to reverse the transaction, and transfer
transactions are pseudonymous.219 Thus, identifying the thirdparty holder of the collateral with the security interest would be
difficult.
However, if it was possible to identify the virtual currency
collateral in the hands of a third-party transferee, this would mean
that some third party may have to turn over the virtual currency
to the secured party. True, the UCC Article 9 notice mechanisms
are meant to protect third parties by giving them notice of security
interests,220 but is it commercially efficient to require a check of
Article 9 financing statements every time one transacts in virtual
214. § 9-317(d).
215. See supra Parts I-II.
216. See supra Section III.B.4; see also § 1-201(b)(15); Schroeder, supra note 11, at
19; NBD-Sandusky Bank v. Ritter, 446 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
217. U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019); Schroeder, supra note 11, at 23; Hewitt, supra note 208, at 631-32.
218. See supra Section III.B.6.
219. Gely-Rojas, supra note 11, at 141; Wenker, supra note 127.
220. Bradley, supra note 174, at 977-78.
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currency? The end result would likely be a third party who did
not check Article 9 financing statements learning that there is a
lien on the virtual currency.221
Given the benefits of liquidity for virtual currency, the expectation that a third party would check to see if there is a security
interest attached to virtual currency reduces that liquidity. Indeed, it is commercial efficiency and the benefits of liquidity with
regard to money that prompted the drafters of UCC Article 9 to
exclude money from the rule that a security interest follows the
collateral in the hands of a third party.222 Accordingly, the inefficiencies of the current Article 9 system with regard to the practical ability of a secured party to trace and enforce security interests
in virtual currency creates additional problems of uncertainty and
risks for secured-party creditors.
VI. CONCLUSION
Article 9 of the UCC in its present form has too many risks
for creditors who want to accept virtual currency as collateral.
Does virtual currency fall under the scope of Article 9? If it does,
under what collateral category for purposes of creation of the security interest and perfection? If we can create a security interest
in virtual currency and perfect that interest, how do subsequent
creditors know there is a security interest in specific virtual currency, and how does a secured party trace the collateral? We do
not have definitive answers to these questions as the courts have
yet to rule on these issues, and the Joint Study Committee on the
Uniform Commercial Code and Emerging Technologies has yet
to issue any suggestions. This uncertainty for virtual currency as
collateral reduces the likelihood it will be accepted as collateral
under the present laws223 and underscores the need to clarify the
law.

221. See Hewitt, supra note 208, at 630-31; Lawless, supra note 168.
222. See § 9-332 cmt. 3.
223. See Hewitt, supra note 208, at 631; Lawless, supra note 168.

